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Abstract 
The rapid evolution and spread of health markets across low and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) has contributed to a significant increase in the availability of health-related goods 
and services around the world. The support institutions needed to regulate these markets have 
lagged behind, with regulatory systems that are weak and under-resourced. This paper 
explores the key issues associated with regulation of health markets in LMICs, and the 
different goals of regulation, namely quality and safety of care, value for money, social 
agreement over fair access and financing, and accountability. Licensing, price controls, and 
other traditional approaches to the regulation of markets for health products and services have 
played an important role, but they have been of questionable effectiveness in ensuring safety 
and efficacy at the point of the user in LMICs. The paper proposes a health market systems 
conceptual framework, using the value chain for the production, distribution and retail of 
health goods and services, to examine regulation of health markets in the LMIC context. We 
conclude by exploring the changing context going forwards, laying out implications for 
future heath market regulation. We argue that the case for new approaches to the regulation 
of markets for health products and services in LMICs is compelling. Although traditional 
"command and control" approaches will have a place in the toolkit of regulators, a broader 
bundle of approaches is needed that is adapted to the national and market-level context of 
particular LMICs. The implication is that it is not possible to apply standard or single 
interventions across countries, as approaches proven to work well in one context will not 
necessarily work well elsewhere. 
Background 
Over the past two or three decades there has been a rapid evolution and spread of health 
markets across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). By this we mean there is some 
form of financial exchange (inside and outside the legal framework) between the users and 
providers of these services in a large proportion of health care encounters. This has been 
associated with a significant increase in the availability of health-related goods and services 
in all but the most remote localities. Indeed, absolute shortages of primary care services and 
pharmaceuticals are no longer the prevalent issue in many countries, but instead the chief 
concerns relate to the safety and efficacy of health care and drugs, and costs that preclude 
access by the poor [1]. 
Given that health markets in many LMICs have evolved rapidly and with little or no 
planning, the development of support institutions has tended to lag behind. In many cases 
markets for health products and services are not well linked to the broader health system, and 
regulatory systems are weak and under-resourced. A significant proportion of transactions 
take place outside the legal framework. At an individual level, patients are subjected to 
unnecessary, dangerous and expensive treatments, whilst often not being referred for life-
saving treatments when these are needed. A significant proportion of medicines are sub-
standard or counterfeit [2] In addition, treatment-resistant organisms can develop due to 
inappropriate use of antibiotics, antivirals and anti-malarials, and the disconnection between 
health market actors and the rest of the health system diminishes the effectiveness of disease 
surveillance [3]. 
A rather narrow view of regulation is as a government function involving administrative and 
bureaucratic controls aimed at correcting market failures through laws, orders, and rules 
placed by government on enterprises, citizens, and government, itself [4]. This kind of 
government regulation plays an important role in protecting the public against incompetent 
medical practices and dangerous medicines. However, it has failed to live up to expectations 
in many countries because of the limited information available to the state on the functioning 
of markets, the limited capacity of the state to enforce regulations, and the potential for 
capture of the state by special interests or by its own rent-seeking officials. More generally, 
there is an increasing recognition that states, on their own, are unable to regulate the complex 
health systems of the 21st Century effectively. One possible implication is that states should 
withdraw from trying to regulate modern economies. However, a large body of evidence has 
shown that unregulated markets in health and many other sectors can lead to highly 
undesirable outcomes, particularly for the poor. This has led analysts to seek a deeper 
understanding of the relationships between public and private actors and how these 
relationships influence the degree to which markets meet social needs [5-7]. Alongside state 
regulation of enterprises (so-called public regulation), enterprises are seen to regulate one 
another (“private regulation”) and even to regulate themselves through internal management 
arrangements (“self-regulation”) [8]. Civil society organizations also play important 
regulatory roles. In the realm of public regulation, there is a recognised shift from ‘hard’ to 
‘soft’ law [9], whereby ‘rules of conduct’ are applied, which have no legally-binding force 
but nevertheless influence behaviour [10]. There is also an increasing interest in regulatory 
partnerships between state and non-state actors. 
Non-state actors have a long history of exerting regulatory powers. A variety of trade 
associations, such as the guilds in Medieval Europe, have long regulated suppliers of goods 
and services. Self-regulating professions have played a similar role. Commercial networks, 
including franchises, set and enforce standards by their members. It has long been recognised 
that there is a tension between the role of these associations and networks in regulating the 
technical competence and ethical behaviour of their members and in helping their members to 
improve their livelihoods, sometimes at the cost of the public good. The state and a variety of 
stakeholder groups, such as consumer associations and political movements, provide a 
countervailing influence to organised interest groups. The degree to which a regulatory 
framework meets social needs is largely an outcome of political competition between these 
stakeholders. 
An important explanation of the need for regulatory arrangements in health and several other 
sectors is the asymmetry of information between the possessors of specialised knowledge and 
expertise and the rest of the population [11]. Societies have developed mechanisms to ensure 
that practitioners are competent and refrain from abusing the power this knowledge gives 
them. Associations of these experts, or organizations that employ them, are best placed to 
ensure the quality of their performance, but they may prioritise the interests of the suppliers 
of expertise. The state and other stakeholder groups tend to have less capacity to assess their 
expertise. This has influenced the outcome of the political competition described above. In 
addition, the understandings of “experts” are strongly influenced by their training and 
professional networks; they often ignore other perspectives, including those of the people 
they are trying to serve [12]. This can lead to inadequately informed policies, such as the 
attempts to regulate antibiotic use in a top-down fashion in contexts where a majority of the 
population seek care and medicines in informal markets, operating outside the formal and 
state-led regulatory system [13]. 
An effective regulatory arrangement needs to have social legitimacy so that transgressions are 
seen to be unethical. This can result in high levels of compliance without very heavy 
investment in policing of performance. The narrative that explains and legitimates the rules is 
important, since it contributes to the creation of social norms of behaviour. In countries, 
where access to health care is perceived to be a social entitlement, powerful participants in 
the health sector need to justify their behaviour in terms of the public good [14]. This may 
constraint the degree to which they can openly act in a self-interested manner. North argues 
that these internalised ethical rules of behaviour are an important pre-requisite to the 
development of the institutional arrangements to support a complex modern economy 
[15].This aspect of a regulatory framework is an important element in the path dependency of 
regulatory arrangements. 
Efforts by the governments of LMICs to import institutional arrangements for the regulation 
of health markets from the advanced market economies have had limited success [16,17]. In 
many cases, the underlying rule-making and enforcement systems are weak, and the lack of 
systems of accountability means that efforts to regulate can contribute to corruption rather 
than improvements in quality or access to health products and services [18]. New approaches 
are needed that build on existing arrangements in LMICs [19]. Thus, a number of authors 
have begun to explore options for the regulation of health markets in LMICs [20-22], 
emphasising the role of partnerships between the state, market actors, and civil society in the 
formulation and implementation of market governance arrangements. These arrangements 
must recognise and reflect the interests and incentives of market actors and address questions 
such as the following [18]. Why are the incentives for the provision of good quality health 
products and services weak? How can these incentives be augmented in the most effective 
and resource-efficient manner? And, how can the state and civil society organisations ensure 
that the health system takes into account public health needs? 
This paper explores the regulation of health markets in LMICs. It outlines the objectives of 
regulation and identifies the targets of regulatory efforts. It then defines a conceptual 
framework for examining regulation of health markets in the LMIC context, lays out a range 
of options that can be packaged to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of regulation. Finally, 
it explores the context going forwards, laying out implications for future heath market 
regulation. 
Objectives of health market regulation 
The following paragraphs explore the multiple objectives for regulating health markets and 
argue that different types of objectives can be addressed by different regulatory approaches. 
In regulating markets for health products and services, governments typically focus on a 
broad set of issues: 
• Quality of care: Are providers of health services competent? Is health care safe and 
effective? Are medicines and medical equipment safe and effective? 
• Value for money: Is health care available at a ‘reasonable’ price? Is it cost-effective? Is it 
affordable given the resources available to consumers of health products and services as 
well as society as a whole? 
• Social agreement: Is health care seen to be provided in a fair and equitable way, in terms 
of both access and financing? 
• Accountability: Is health care provided and paid for in a transparent way that holds key 
actors responsible? 
Governments may also take into account issues of macro-economic growth and international 
trade by protecting local companies against competition and/or supporting these companies in 
foreign markets. They may also introduce regulations to influence market structure and 
increase competition. This paper does not address these issues and focuses on regulations 
specific to health, although we refer to some emerging challenges with regard to the latter 
issues in the final section. 
Over time and across populations, expectations differ with respect to the performance of 
health markets and, by implication, what regulatory systems are expected to achieve. Key 
factors include the level of economic development, patterns of disease burden, complexity of 
health systems and access to information through the media and the Internet. The most basic 
aims of a health regulatory system concern the protection of the population against generally-
recognised and high-level risks, for example dangerous and/or ineffective medicines, harmful 
practices by incompetent practitioners, the control of epidemics, and exposure to addictive 
drugs. The failure of government to provide this kind of basic protection, which can require 
considerable investment in infrastructure and institutional development, can challenge its 
very legitimacy. 
As incomes rise, institutional and governance arrangements are strengthened, the health 
system becomes more sophisticated and expectations of citizens with respect to protection 
against risks tend to rise. Whilst the costs of achieving this can escalate rapidly, the existence 
of more complex institutional arrangements can make it possible for the health sector to 
provide products and services on the basis of trust between different providers, funders and 
users [23]. This implies that the perspective of government needs to shift towards the 
conditions needed in order for trust between market actors to be established and maintained. 
The creation of such institutional arrangements can be seen as the building of a social 
contract for health and health services [14]. 
What and who is regulated? 
In trying to fulfil the broad social objectives of health market regulation outlined above, 
governments have traditionally focused their efforts on health products and equipment, and 
practitioners and facilities engaged in the provision of health services (Table 1). For these, 
regulations have variously attempted to control the volume, safety and quality, and/or price 
[20]. 
Table 1 Regulation of health products and services 
Parameter Health 
Practitioners/Providers 
Medicines Health 
Facilities 
Medical 
Equipment 
Volume Limits on numbers in medical 
school, residency, or licensed 
Public 
procurement 
arrangements 
Approvals to 
establish 
facilities 
Limits on major 
equipment 
purchases 
Safety and 
Quality 
Training and continuing 
education requirements 
Product and/or 
process 
standards 
Product 
and/or process 
standards 
Product and/or 
process 
standards 
Licensing 
systems 
Licensing 
systems 
Licensing 
systems 
Product labelling 
requirements 
  
Price Salary scales Import 
restrictions 
Control on 
service prices 
Control on 
service prices 
Subsidies   
Controls on 
product prices 
  
Adapted from Ensor and Weinzierl (2006). 
The most common regulation of health markets in LMICs is the certification of health 
providers [24]. This is usually a mandatory requirement in terms of minimum educational 
conditions in order to practice for those with formal training as physicians, nurses and other 
health professions. In most LMICs, once the initial licensing standards have been met, there 
is little regulation that requires health providers to ensure that they maintain their skills. 
The regulation of medicines and medical equipment in most LMICs has evolved and 
developed somewhat in recent years. Nearly all countries have regulatory agencies to register 
and monitor pharmaceutical safety, although these differ widely in their capacity and 
effectiveness. Indeed, many national drug authorities are ill-equipped to do testing for drug 
efficacy, safety and/or quality, whether for products manufactured domestically or imported. 
This situation is exacerbated by the weakness of controls on imports, especially in the case of 
informal trade from neighbouring countries. In most cases their ability to monitor for adverse 
events due to medicines is virtually non-existent. 
Many LMICs have adopted essential medicines programmes whereby drug use in the public 
sector is restricted to a set of essential medicines. Most have difficulty applying these policies 
to the private sector, where a high proportion of drug sales take place in many countries. 
Weaknesses in controls on imports, as outlined above, provide an additional element of 
complexity. 
The licensing of health facilities and equipment usually involves the development and 
application of physical standards with which compliance is required. In most LMICs these 
requirements are based on international standards. Whereas a number of LMICs have adopted 
standards for health facilities and equipment, most lack the capacity to undertake meaningful 
conformity assessment, including testing and inspection functions, and enforcement. 
Beyond the safety and efficacy of health products and services, many LMIC governments 
make efforts to facilitate access by the poor. Such efforts most frequently take the form of 
price controls at the wholesale or retail levels of the supply chain or subsidies of an implicit 
or explicit kind at the point of supply. These controls are easier to achieve in the context of 
public sector provision, although weak administrative controls often mean that informal 
payments are imposed on users. Effective price controls are more difficult in the private 
sector due to weak enforcement capacity on the part of government and little incentive for 
compliance on the part of health product and service providers. 
These approaches to the regulation of markets for health products and services have 
supported the creation of systems with the capacity to deliver safe and effective health 
services in some countries. However, in many others, people continue to face serious 
problems with the safety, effectiveness and cost of health services. This is associated with the 
limited reach of the formal regulatory system and the incentives that encourage practices that 
are not in the public interest. The disconnection between government aspirations to control 
the health system through administrative measures and reality is particularly apparent with 
efforts to regulate the private sector. Thus, while it may be plausible to stipulate the 
medicines that can be used for particular conditions in public hospitals and clinics, laying 
down systems of incentives and penalties to induce private providers to follow these rules is 
much more problematic. In most cases the revenues of private providers are dependent on the 
volumes of medicines they sell, and at the same time there may be pressure from patients for 
drugs to be prescribed even if they are not needed or are even harmful. 
The nature of the value chains [25,26] for health-related products and services in many 
LMICs raises additional questions about the efficacy of administrative approaches to 
regulation. These can span the formal and informal sectors and involve both large and small 
enterprises, and often have weak linkages between different parts of the chain. The ultimate 
aim of the regulation of health products and services is to ensure they are safe, effective, and 
affordable at the point of use. The locus of much regulation is on inputs to the supply of these 
products and services; for example trained practitioners, manufacturers, or importers of drugs 
and medical equipment. The efficacy of such an approach is dependent, however, on the 
integrity of the value chain beyond the point of regulation and to the point of end-use. This 
will determine the extent to which the characteristics of the product or service are maintained 
beyond the point of regulation. For example, regulating the manufacture and distribution of 
drugs will be ineffective at ensuring safe, quality and efficacious products if there is an 
appreciable supply of unregulated and sub-standard imports and if retailers do not provide 
informed guidance about the use of these products. 
The fact that the value chain for health products and services in many LMICs involves 
numerous formal and informal sector actors with weak linkages along the chain suggests that 
regulation needs to pay particular attention near to the point of use. However, it is easiest to 
regulate value chains at so-called ‘pinch points’ where there are a smaller number of critical 
actors [24,25]. These include, for example, manufacturers and importers of drugs as opposed 
to the multitude of informal market distributors. This suggests a need for the regulation of 
health products and services to be customised to fit local value chain contexts, and adapted as 
value chains develop and evolve over time. At the same time, regulation can be a driver of 
the restructuring of the value chain, for example through licencing arrangements that limit the 
number and/or characteristics of actors, with longer-term implications for wider regulatory 
approaches. 
Regulation of health products and services in LMICs 
The regulation of health products and services needs to balance the costs and benefits 
incurred by the regulator, by actors along the value chain, by the eventual provider and by 
society, as a whole [20]. The combined costs should be less than the social costs of market 
failure that are being mitigated through the regulation. Regulators incur costs in developing 
and implementing the regulation and in undertaking conformity assessment and enforcement 
efforts. The costs of achieving compliance are borne along the value chain – the set of 
activities required to deliver a service or product to the market. In health markets, these 
include ingredient (input) suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, educational and training 
establishments, hospitals and clinics, etc. These costs include the upgrading of facilities 
and/or procedures, purchase of new equipment, training and establishing and maintaining 
administrative procedures. Both regulators and value chain actors in many LMICs lack these 
resources, such that while regulations may be efficient in principle, they are not implemented 
to the level where they are efficient. Alternatively, the relatively well off may use services 
that are regulated, while the poor use less expensive, unregulated services. 
In order for the regulation to be effective, actors must be able to achieve compliance within 
the existing economic and technical constraints, and the regulation itself must be enforceable. 
From the perspective of the entities being regulated, this implies that the opportunity costs of 
compliance should be at least no more than the costs of non-compliance, including the direct 
costs of fines and sanctions and the loss of revenue or professional prestige from non-
compliance. Regulators can enhance the costs of non-compliance through their enforcement 
actions (for example increasing the frequency of inspection) and the scale of penalties 
imposed when infractions are identified. However, regulator costs tend to rise in line with the 
scale and scope of enforcement. It is unsurprising, therefore, that regulators in LMICs lack 
the resources to implement enforcement regimes that achieve the desired rates of compliance 
[20]. 
Questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of administrative approaches to regulation 
are not restricted to LMICs. Indeed, a number of analysts of the advanced market economies 
have moved away from a state-centred understanding of regulation. So-called “decentred” 
understandings of regulation draw on five central notions [5]: (i) the complexity of 
interactions between actors or systems; (ii) the fragmentation of knowledge, power and 
control; (iii) the autonomy of actors and limited capacity to govern them; (iv) the level and 
nature of interactions and inter-dependencies between actors; and (v) the lack of a clear 
distinction between the public and private sectors. These understandings draw attention to the 
roles that a variety of state and non-state actors play in ensuring that the public interest is 
reflected in the operations of markets. This decentred understanding of regulation potentially 
provides a useful way forward in thinking about the future regulation of health products and 
services in LMICs. 
Decentred understandings of regulation accord well with a market systems approach for 
assessing and defining alternative strategies for improving the performance of health markets, 
especially towards better meeting the needs of the poor [1]. Seeing health markets as complex 
adaptive systems enables us to explore options for regulation and the drivers of how these 
perform from a broader perspective than is the basis of administrative approaches (Figure 1). 
The supply and demand for health products and services is at the core of a health market 
system, and is influenced by regulatory efforts to inform, communicate, set and enforce rules. 
The model recognises that the demand for healthcare does not perfectly reflect health needs, 
due in part to information asymmetry, and knowledge, financial, geographic, and social 
barriers that impede demand. 
Figure 1 Health market systems and regulatory approaches. 
The market systems model suggests that a wide variety actors and institutions (shown in 
green in Figure 1) influence the performance of health markets, including both formally-
recognised actors (for example doctors, hospitals and clinics, drug manufacturers, etc.) and 
informal actors and institutions (for example traditional healers, social norms and networks, 
etc.) that are inter-related and organised in varying ways. These actors rarely comply with a 
strict public-private dichotomy. Furthermore, the performance of the system needs to be 
considered not only in terms of the short-term delivery of health products and services, but 
also the long-term sustainability of the system. Account must be taken, therefore, of the scope 
for maintaining financial and human resource flows, upholding infrastructural and 
institutional capacities, and achieving sustained supplies of medical products and equipment 
(Health System Support in Figure 1). 
Seeing health markets as complex adaptive systems suggests that the impacts of regulation 
need to be examined not only in terms of the supply and demand for products and services 
that comply with safety, efficacy, and affordability requirements, but also in terms of wider 
and often unintended and unanticipated outcomes [26]. For example, regulations can 
variously reinforce and undermine established market relations on the basis of trust, the net 
outcome of which is uncertain. They can also induce compensatory behaviours on the part of 
both providers and users of health products and services that can have wide-ranging 
consequences in terms of access of the poor to health products and services, drug resistance, 
ability to conduct disease surveillance, and structure of the healthcare system. A recent paper 
by Xiao et al., for example, illustrates how the introduction of a regulation aimed at reducing 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals in rural health facilities in China had differing impacts on 
health system performance between districts [27]. 
Complex systems also display path dependency, suggesting that regulatory institutions 
develop out of specific historical, economic and socio-political contexts, that are not simply 
reversible or replicable (illustrated in the top oval in Figure 1). For this reason, regulatory 
systems that work in one context may not work so well in another. Further, the emergence of 
regulation cannot be seen as distinct or divorced from the nature of the markets being 
regulated and the actors within the associated value chains. Thus, regulations tend to be co-
constructed and driven by policy ‘entrepreneurs’ not only in government but also in 
commercial enterprises and other non-government entities [28]. At the same time, unofficial 
or social norms of market behaviour can alternatively precede or be induced by government 
regulation. An examination of the development of markets for specific products and services 
in advanced market economies has shown that the leading firms in a sector strongly influence 
the organisation of markets as an important element in their survival strategy [29]. These 
firms might lobby, for example, for the creation of standards that create barriers to entry by 
potential competitors. The outcome of this lobbying is strongly influenced, in turn, by the 
responses of other firms, other stakeholders and the state. 
The emergent properties of complex adaptive systems, in addition, mean that regulation can 
induce fundamental changes in the ways that both health markets and wider institutions are 
organised. For example, they may bring about processes of consolidation or proliferation at 
particular levels of the value chain, reinforcing or undermining value chain linkages, 
catalysing the self-organisation of value chain actors or users of health products and services, 
and empowering or disempowering regulatory officials and bodies. In Figure 1, this is shown 
as the organization of consumer groups and informal provider associations in the bottom 
oval. If and when these changes become reflected in new social norms, they will tend to be 
relatively robust, requiring quite profound changes to induce further processes of change. Of 
course, market actors recognise these processes and will make efforts to steer the course of 
regulation in their favour, as reflected in the notion of regulatory capture. 
Theory and practice with complex systems, therefore, suggests that the design and 
implementation of effective and efficient regulation requires that the broad set of actors 
within markets for health products and services are brought together in processes of 
structured learning and coalition-building. This type of intervention is conceived as a 
perturbation to the market system that needs to continuously change in response to changes in 
the market (Figure 1). In so doing, the distinct and sometimes conflicting interests of these 
actors, their differing experiences and competencies, and prevailing power relations between 
them need to be recognised [3]. This is not easy to achieve in practice. As with any complex 
system, markets for health products and services are dynamic, requiring that different actors 
are involved in these processes over time and regulatory approaches are updated (or at least 
reassessed) on a continuous basis. 
Recognition that regulations are co-constructed by regulators, health market actors and other 
non-government entities requires that political mechanisms be established that prevent undue 
influence by powerful interest groups. The performance of these mechanisms will reflect the 
degree to which the poor and relatively powerless are able to mobilise to ensure that their 
interests and points of view are taken into account. The outcome will involve the negotiation 
of rules that have wide social acceptance as legitimate and which define agreed moral norms 
of behaviour. Examples might include the widespread agreement that drugs need to be safe 
and reliably effective, that health workers should not prescribe dangerous drugs, and that very 
sick people should be referred to hospital and provided appropriate care. The negotiation of 
these norms is a political process that inevitably involves conflicts between different interests 
and understandings. However, such rules not only act to constrain the behaviour of market 
actors, but can also be critical preconditions and catalysts for effective linkages within value 
chains, acting to induce trust and reduce transaction costs. 
The institutional arrangements for health-related markets in the advanced market economies 
were created over decades through quite gradual processes that reflected the path 
dependencies and emergent properties described above [30,31]. Regularised practices became 
established whereby broad norms of behaviour were established amongst market actors and 
regulators, with the expectation that transgressors would be punished. In turn, this meant that 
regulatory and enforcement resources could be used more expeditiously, with greater 
attention given to emerging issues and transgressions at the margin. These institutions were 
built upon a broader social consensus of what constitutes fairness and legitimacy of social 
arrangements – what has been called a “welfare regime”[32]. 
The situation in many LMICs today is very different, reflecting the rapid emergence and 
spread of health markets. In general, there have not been the opportunities for linkages and 
relationships between actors within health product and service value chains, and between 
these actors and regulators, to emerge and for behavioural norms to become established. 
Thus, the onus is on government regulation to moderate behaviour, with regulators looking to 
the advanced market economies for examples of ‘best practice’ that can be implemented ‘off 
the shelf’. A market systems perspective, of course, warns that regulatory approaches do not 
necessarily transfer well. What works well in health markets with limited types of formal 
sector actors and a relatively well-resourced regulator, may be ineffectual in the context of 
informal markets with a large variety of actors and an under-resourced regulator. This 
suggests that a special effort will be needed to facilitate the forging of new kinds of 
partnerships that can begin to create effective institutions to regulate these markets. 
Potential regulatory strategies 
The foregoing discussion has highlighted how administrative approaches to the regulation of 
markets for health products and services may be ineffective and inefficient in LMICs. The 
shift in perspective towards decentred views of regulation and the understanding of health 
markets as complex adaptive systems suggests opportunities for regulating in innovative 
ways. At the same time, the nature of health market systems suggests that regulations are co-
constructed by many actors and that these can have wide-ranging and sometimes unintended 
consequences that can have profound implications for the ways health markets are organised 
and operate. Defining alternatives to traditional regulatory modes needs to be approached 
with some care. 
In approaching the implementation or reform of health market regulation in LMICs, it is 
important to recognise and build on established formal and informal rules and norms that 
influence the behaviour of health product and service providers and all actors along the value 
chain. It is also important to appreciate how efforts to implement more effective regulation 
relate to (and are dependent upon) other supply and demand-side interventions. For example, 
financial incentives may be linked to efforts to build and reform institutions and human 
capital, consumer education and empowerment, or wider policy reforms (such as in the area 
of trade, consumer product safety, and intellectual property). For many policy actors this 
requires a change in perspective and culture away from a preoccupation with established and 
formal institutions such as medical colleges, pharmacies and hospitals. 
Table 2 presents a categorisation of potential strategies for the regulation of health product 
and service markets in LMIC, building on the work of others [20,21,33]. A distinction is 
made between administrative and bureaucratic controls (for example official registration and 
licensing systems), market supply-oriented approaches (for example self-regulation and 
contracting), consumer and/or citizen-oriented approaches (for example access to 
information), and collaboration-oriented approaches (for example co-production of products 
and/or services). Cutting across the options in Table 2 are interventions at various levels of 
the value chain, from training of practitioners and the manufacture of drugs and medical 
equipment through to end product and service markets. 
Table 2 Regulatory strategies in health markets 
Regulatory Strategy Action Weaknesses 
Administrative and bureaucratic controls 
Criminalisation of 
malpractice 
Standards of practice are backed by criminal 
penalties 
Complex and inflexible rules. 
Enforcement may be difficult, time-
consuming, and costly. High compliance 
costs and the courts and regulators must 
be seen as independent. 
Licensing and 
accreditation of 
providers and facilities 
Standards based requirement to provide 
services or sell product applying to health 
facilities, health workers, or products 
Needs information available to all actors. 
High costs of maintenance and 
enforcement for some items. 
Product registration 
(e.g. drugs, vaccines, 
medical equipment and 
supplies) 
Health products must meet specified 
standards. Often extends to requirements for 
importation or for labelling and advertising. 
Costly and complex to enforce if testing is 
required. Needs high information and 
testing capabilities. 
Product surveillance Post-marketing Expensive and potential for bias in 
collecting information. May be difficult to 
attribute health outcome to product. 
Market supply-oriented 
Self-regulation Association of providers or suppliers of 
goods and/or services sets standards which 
provide either a voluntary or enforceable 
code. Can be linked to a system of 
certification. 
Requires government and public trust of 
providers. Danger of regulatory capture. 
Difficult to manage incentives 
collectively. 
Contracting Government purchases services from 
provider at verified quality, quantity, and/or 
price standards 
Information gaps present. May have high 
administrative and technical requirements. 
Monopoly of providers may limit 
competition 
Incentives and subsidies Funds or other inducements provided for 
desired provider behaviour (e.g. location of 
practice, quality of service, permission for 
private practice, etc.) 
Information gaps prevalent. May not 
prevent poor behaviour. 
Disclosure Offenders and poor performers are “named 
and shamed” 
Requires assessment and communication 
seen as independent and trustworthy. 
Need viable alternatives for providers 
Management 
improvement 
Health providers (and organisations) trained 
and supported to improve quality and safety 
Time consuming and potentially costly. 
May produce little change in incentives on 
its own -- a supportive strategy dependent 
on additional regulatory strategies. 
Consumer or citizen-oriented 
Consumer education Efforts to inform and educate consumers 
about the safety, quality and efficacy of 
health products and services and how to 
judge this at the point of provision 
Difficult to reach and impact on most 
vulnerable consumers, namely the poor. 
Potentially very costly. 
Right to information by 
citizens 
Legal requirement to provide basic 
information. 
Cost of collection and analysis of 
information and often difficult to enforce. 
Consumer rights Patient rights are identified and protected by 
law. 
Places onus on individual to report 
violations that have already occurred. 
Need for possibly expensive system for 
arbitration. 
Patient redress Patients have ability to identify violations 
and seek resolution with provider 
organization or agreed arbitrator. 
Places onus on individual to report 
violations that have already occurred. 
Citizen empowerment Communities or civil society organizations 
are provided with authority, resources, and 
capability to set local policy, assess 
performance, and sanction and reward. 
Wide variation across communities in 
capabilities and interests; May be costly. 
Capture by local elites possible. May be 
hard to implement consistently on a large 
scale. 
Liability norms Definition of strict or liability standards that 
enable users of health products and services 
to sue for damages should injury occur. 
Requires that citizens have access to the 
resources to pursue liability claims, or that 
class action is possible. Dependent on 
ability to relate cases of harm to specific 
health products or services. 
Collaboration oriented 
Co-production (of 
services and regulation 
across key 
stakeholders) 
Health providers, along with government 
agencies, private companies and/or 
consumer groups negotiate and share power, 
authority, and resources to ensure quality, 
safety, price or coverage of health services 
and products. 
Honest broker may be needed to facilitate 
collaboration. Information gaps present. 
Need to continuously assess and 
renegotiate arrangements (is this a 
weakness?). Danger of capture by the 
powerful. 
Partnerships for 
transparency and 
accountability 
Government, civil society actors, providers, 
and/or independent technical experts set 
locally measurable and enforceable 
standards for performance. 
May require external facilitation and 
convening. May address limited scale and 
scope of issues. 
Collectively the four approaches in Table 2 suggest that the propensity of health markets in 
LMICs to deliver products and services that are inaccessibly priced and/or are substandard in 
terms of safety, quality and/or efficacy emanates from a number of constraints. First, and in 
many ways the overarching issue, are fundamental imperfections and asymmetries in access 
to information. Many of the options in Table 2 address this directly, for example through 
standard-setting, product registration and licensing. In part the weakness of information in 
health markets reflects the fact that perceptions of safety, quality and efficacy of health 
products and services reflect, at best actual experiences, and in many cases rely on poorly 
defined characteristics of suppliers that are believed to denote quality. The market failures in 
such contexts are well documented [33]. For example, there is a tendency for ‘bad’ products 
to crowd out ‘good’ products when the user is unable to distinguish adequately between 
these. Further, in the absence of reliable information on the safety and efficacy of products 
and services, users are driven to use proxies, such as price, which are imperfect at best and 
can be used as the basis of false product differentiation. 
Second, the need for informed and empowered users of health products and services that 
drive competition in markets and the performance of providers on the basis of safety, quality 
and efficacy. In part this is dependent on users being informed – why safety, quality and 
efficacy matter in terms of the impacts of products and services on their health – and also 
being able to distinguish products and services according to these characteristics. The 
information imperfections described above are critical here. Requirements for the disclosure 
of information to consumers on health products and/or services, patient redress, and 
disclosure-based remedies are aimed directly at the empowerment of consumers. 
The issue of trust is a critical issue in health product and service markets in LMICs. In the 
context of significant information asymmetries, relations along the value chain are dependent 
on trust if the potentially prohibitive transaction costs associated with verifying the safety, 
quality and efficacy of products and services are to be avoided. Trust-based value chain 
relations are especially problematic in the context of rapidly-evolving markets, as is typical of 
LMICs. Some of the options in Table 2 aim to act as proxies for trust or to offset high 
transaction costs. Examples include licensing and accreditation arrangements for health 
producers and facilities, codes of practice linked to certification, and the establishment of 
branded products and services, that are known for their quality. 
Finally, there are concerns about the cost of implementing and maintaining effective 
regulation of health markets in LMICs. In many countries, the regulatory capabilities and the 
underlying institutional capacity are weak. Whereas capacity-building, perhaps backed by 
donor support, is one solution to this problem, the resource requirements can be prohibitive. 
Thus, a number of the options in Table 2 focus on self-regulation, incentives and subsidies, 
and management improvement. 
Given the complexity of issues surrounding health markets in LMICs and also the nature of 
the value chains for health products and services, it is likely that a multi-pronged approach 
will be needed to improve the performance of markets for health-related goods and services. 
Also, reliance on a single regulatory measure is likely to induce compensatory or evasive 
behaviours on the part of market actors. We need to think about packages of complementary 
regulatory measures, the precise mix of which will be context specific. Taking drugs as an 
example, where value chains are well developed and have a high degree of integrity, most 
regulatory efforts can focus at the level of manufacture and/or importation, complemented by 
measures that control the right to prescribe many drugs. Where this is not the case, more 
intensive regulation and enforcement efforts are needed in distribution and end-product and 
service markets. The implication is that regulatory strategies will need to be defined and 
adapted according to local contexts, and adjusted as health markets develop and evolve. This 
recognises that processes of learning are inherent to health market systems, and also that 
regulations themselves are constituents of emergent processes that bring about broader 
changes to health markets and the associated value chains and wider institutions and 
infrastructure. 
Regulation takes place at local, national, regional and international levels. There are 
potentially important roles for institutions at the regional and global levels, through the 
promulgation of regional or international standards and promotion of ‘good practice’ [34]. 
LMICs could make greater use of regulatory capacities beyond their borders as a means to 
reduce regulatory costs. It is important to recognise, however, that global standards are rarely 
promulgated with an eye to the specific context of informal health markets that predominate 
in many LMICs, and they may have little or no influence over the ways that health products 
and services are provided in practice. Further, whilst there are understandable incentives to 
use international private or non-governmental organization (NGO) providers of health 
products and services that are subject to more rigorous regulatory regimes in their home 
country, this does little to engender local regulatory or compliance capabilities. 
Reforming approaches to the regulation of health markets in LMICs is not something that can 
be driven from outside. The ultimate aim has to be the establishment of rules that are 
recognised as legitimate by all stakeholders in the provision and use of health products and 
services, and that are internalised as behavioural norms. A recent paper by Ahmed et al. on 
Bangladesh suggests four key elements for what it calls “better management of pluralism” 
[35]: (i) participatory governance mechanisms, (ii) effective regulation and accountability; 
(iii) common information systems and (iv) building competencies for pluralistic governance. 
This will entail a process that involves a wide range of actors from both within and outside 
health markets. Health practitioners, manufacturers and/or suppliers of drugs and medical 
equipment, consumer representatives, policy-makers, researchers and the like clearly need to 
be ‘at the table’. But so also do political leaders, the media, faith groups and other elements 
of civil society. The outcome will be strongly influenced by the degree to which different 
social groups can mobilise to ensure that political leaders take their interests and perspectives 
into account. 
Conclusions: building regulatory institutions in a rapidly 
changing context 
Many LMICs face the challenge of creating institutional arrangements for their health 
systems in a context of rapid change and rising public expectations. Attempts to import 
models from the advanced market economies are often not effective. These countries cannot 
retrace the lengthy process through which the latter countries created their regulatory 
arrangements. There is little systematic evidence on strategies for building effective 
institutional solutions to the problem of asymmetric information in low and middle-income 
countries [18]. Countries will have to pursue a learning-by-doing strategy, in which they test 
alternative interventions and build on what can be shown to work. 
In building new regulatory arrangements, LMICs face several special challenges. The first is 
the degree to which market structures and norms of behaviour have become established in the 
informal and formal sectors in many countries. The process of change is likely to be highly 
contested and complex. 
The second is role of the relatively small number of large multi-national companies that 
supply pharmaceuticals and diagnostic technologies. They have actively engaged in the 
creation of the regulatory frameworks in the advanced market economies. However, they 
have largely viewed LMICs as potential markets, without becoming strongly engaged in the 
creation of effective institutions. This has contributed to the very large market in counterfeit 
drugs and to the inappropriate use of many pharmaceuticals [2]. Experience over many years 
suggests that LMIC governments cannot address these problems alone; their capabilities and 
resources are simply inadequate. This suggests the need for explicit and transparent 
regulatory partnerships with multinationals and other stakeholders through the value chain 
that put in place the necessary controls whilst recognising the risk of regulatory capture. 
The third is the emergence of new health-related companies in rapidly growing middle-
income countries. Whereas the regulatory framework in the advanced market economies has 
restricted vertical integration between pharmaceutical companies, retail pharmacy chains, and 
prescribers of medications to reduce the incentive to sell excessive volumes of medicines, this 
may not be the case in many LMICs. It is not unreasonable to expect that complex ownership 
structures will emerge in these countries with a significant degree of vertical integration and 
horizontal market concentration. At present there are no agreed global regulatory standards 
relating to the ownership and vertical integration of health systems, putting the entire onus on 
national governments to put controls in place. Not only is it highly questionable that these 
governments have the required capacities, but there is a lack of horizon scanning at the global 
level to identify where, when and why problems occur and what can be done about them. 
The fourth is the speed of potentially disruptive innovations in information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and in point of treatment diagnostics. The rapid diffusion 
of access to the internet through mobile phones is enabling people in countries with weak 
health systems to gain access to expert advice and to products and services at more accessible 
prices [36]. However, mechanisms for ensuring the quality of information provided to 
consumers are weak, especially in LMICs. Further, these technologies have the potential to 
act as powerful new pathways for major stakeholders to establish large market shares. The 
rapid diffusion of ICTs in LMICs is also creating opportunities for the more effective and 
efficient regulation of markets for health products and services. Thus, we are observing 
examples of social networks in a number of LMICs, which enable consumers to distribute 
information on sub-standard products and/or service providers. These technologies alone, 
however, are not sufficient effectively to ‘discipline’ providers of products or services that 
are of poor quality. The overall impact of ICTs on health systems and the degree to which it 
makes them more accountable for quality and costs, will depend, to a large extent, on the 
regulatory framework that governments put in place. 
The history of health system development in the advanced market economies has shown that 
decisions made early on can have profound effects for many years in the future. This suggests 
that the outcome of current efforts to build appropriate institutional arrangements for a 
modern health system in LMICs will have a powerful influence on future development. That 
is why it is particularly important that health system analysts understand the structure and 
operation of the complex markets that have emerged and build systematic knowledge on 
effective strategies for influencing their performance. The creation of appropriate institutional 
arrangements to regulate complex health markets will be an increasingly important health 
priority in coming years, and one to which all those with an interest in the access of the poor 
in LMICs to safe and effective health products and services must attend. 
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